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tion to the Court of Appeals of Maryland:
"Under an automobile insurance policy
covering Maryland insureds, is a provision
in that policy requiring physical contact
between the insureds' vehicle and the
phantom vehicle lawful and enforceable
under Maryland law where the accident
occurs outside the State of Maryland?" Lee
v. Wheeler, 810 F.2d 303, 304 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
In answering "no" to the question,
Judge Adkins reviewed the principle in
State Farm and expanded it to encompass
accidents happening outside Maryland
involving Maryland insureds.
In State Farm, the Maryland Automobile
Insurance Fund (MAIF) sought a declaration that an insurance policy requiring, as
a prerequisite to coverage, physical contact
between an insured's vehicle and a phantom vehicle violated the uninsured motorist provision of Md. Ann. Code art. 48A,
§ 541(c) (1957, 1986 Repl. Vol.) which
mandates that "[i]n no case shall the uninsured motorist coverage be less than the
coverage afforded a qualified person under
Md. Ann. Code art. 48A §§ 243H and 2431." Id. at 237, 528 A.2d at 914.
Section 243H(a)(1) allows claims for the
death of or personal injury to qualified
persons "arising out of the ownership,
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle in
this State where the identity of the motor
vehicle and of the operator and owner
thereof cannot be ascertained .... " Claims
against MAIF are authorized without any
distinction between impact and nonimpact phantom drivers. State Fann, 227
Md. at 604,356 A.2d at 562.
Pennsylvania General argued that, due
to the "in this state" language, "§ 541(c)
contains an implied territorial limitation
when read in harmony with §
243H(aX1)." 310 Md. at 238, 528 A.2d at
915.
The court explained that "[t]he primary
purpose of the § 541(a) uninsured motorist
coverage requirement is to assure financial
compensation to the innocent victims of
motor vehicle accidents who are unable to
recover from financially irresponsible
uninsured motorists." 310 Md. at 238,528
A.2d at 915 (quoting Pennsylvania Nat'l
Mut. v. Gartelman, 288 Md. 151, 157, 416
A.2d 734, 737 (1980)).
Hesitant to imply exclusions or recognize exclusions beyond those expressly
enumerated by the legislature, the court
observed that no territorial exclusion or
limitation is evident within the two
express exclusions from mandatory minimum uninsured motorist coverage found
in § 541(cX2). Furthermore, the language
on which Pennsylvania General relied
deals with claims against MAIF rather than

with mandatory motor vehicle liability
insurance. Due to the legislative history of
the sections, there is
a functional continuity of purpose in
the present MAIF provisions that militate against reading § 243H as in any
way qualifying § 541(c)(2) .... The
provision for compulsory automobile
insurance, plus the creation of MAIF
as a liability insurer of last resort, demonstrate the dramatic change in state
policy with respect to protection of
the public from the economic harm
produced by automobile accidents.
310 Md. at 240, 528 A.2d at 916.
Judge Adkins went on to say that "[t]o
insert exclusions by implication or recognize exclusions not expressly prohibited
by the statute has the dangerous potential
of seriously frustrating the policies behind
compulsory automobile liability insurance." Id. at 242,528 A.2d at 917. To allow
such exclusions "would fly in the face of
the broadly-protective public policy"
established through recent case law. Id. at
243, 528 A.2d at 917.
The court declined to express an opinion
on whether Maryland law prohibits a
physical contact requirement in uninsured
motorist coverage in commercial policies
as opposed to personal policies. 310 Md. at
235-36 n. 1, 528 A.2d at 913.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland
expanded the principle of State Farm by
finding an uninsured motorist provision,
limiting coverage to situations in which
there is physical contact between the
insureds' vehicle and the phantom vehicle,
unenforceable against public policy under
Maryland law even when the collision
occurs outside the State of Maryland. By
upholding the primary purpose of the
uninsured motorist coverage requirement,
this ruling assures financial compensation
to the innocent victims of motor vehicle
accidents who are unable to recover from
financially irresponsible uninsured motorists.

-Glen P. Smith

Ellison v. Maryland: CONVICTED
AND SENTENCED CRIMINAL
DEFENDANT WHEN CALLED AS
NON-PARTY WITNESS MAY
INVOKE PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION
In Ellison v. Maryland, 310 Md. 244, 528
A.2d 1271 (1987), the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that one who has been convicted and sentenced in a criminal proceeding may invoke the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination when
called to testify as a non-party witness in a
subsequent proceeding provided that the
thirty-day time limit for taking an appeal
or requesting a sentence review has not
expired. The Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland had similarly held the privilege
applicable but had based their decision on
a rationale which the court of appeals
found to be unsupported by precedent.
Clinton Ellison and Tyrone Little,
inmates at the Maryland Penitentiary,
were charged in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City with the robbery and first
degree murder of fellow inmate Charles
Sneed. Additionally, Ellison and Little
were charged with lesser included substantive offenses and the state filed notices of
intent to seek the death penalty.
The defendants were tried separately,
with the first case against Little. After closing arguments, but before a jury verdict
was returned, the state and Little entered
into a plea agreement. Little agreed to
plead guilty to second degree murder in
return for the state's promise to nol pros
the first degree murder charge as well as
the robbery and lesser charges. The state
also agreed to recommend a twenty-five
year jail sentence to be served concurrently with Little's prior sentence. The agreement was carried out as proposed and
Little was sentenced on June 18, 1984. At
that time the trial court advised Little that
he had thirty days in which to request
either an appeal of his conviction to the
court of special appeals or a review of his
sentence by a three judge panel of the circuit court.
Ellison's trial began on June 25, 1984,
seven days after Little had been sentenced.
During the course of the trial, and before
Little's thirty-day period in which to
request an appeal or sentence review had
expired, Little was called by Ellison to testify as a witness for the defense. Little
invoked the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination and refused to
testify. The trial court upheld Little's
invoking of the privilege and Ellison was
subsequently found guilty of first degree
murder and robbery. He was sentenced to
life imprisonment for the murder and
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received a consecutive ten year sentence
for the robbery.
Ellison took his appeal of right to the
court of special appeals on two grounds.
He firSt argued that Little's claim of the
privilege against self-incrimination should
have been rejected because he had already
been convicted and sentenced on the murder charge and the state had nol prossed
the robbery and lesser offenses. In opposition, the state argued that under the court
of appeals decision in Smith v. State, 283
Md. 187,388 A.2d 539 (1978), eert. denied,
439 U.S. 1130 (1979), Little's claim of privilege was justified because of the potential
for reversal on appeal followed by a new
trial on the same charges.
The court of special appeals stated that
the issue was "[a]t what point on the continuum is the process of incrimination sufficiently complete that the risk of
incrimination is relegated to the past
tense?" Ellison v. State, 65 Md. App. 321,
329, 500 A.2d 650, 654 (1985). The court
ultimately held that "the risk of incrimination terminates at the moment the sentence is pronounced." Id. at 338, 500 A.2d
at 658. In its analysis, the court reasoned
that testimonial privileges are disfavored
and in a close case the court should lean
toward rejecting the privilege. Id. at 327,
500 A.2d at 653. The court of special
appeals further reasoned that sentencing is
the "logical termination point" beyond
which the privilege may not be used
because the potential for future sanctions
then becomes a "mere remote possibility"
which is "beyond the contemplated pale
of the constitutional privilege." Id. at 344,
500 A.2d at 661-62.
Despite the facially logical analysis
posited by the court of special appeals, the
court of appeals nonetheless found it
unpersuasive. The court of appeals instead
accepted the position that the state argued,
that under Smith v. State, Little was entitled to claim the privilege because of the
potential for reversal on appeal followed
by a new trial on the same charges.
In Smith, like the present case, two
Defendants were arrested together but
tried separately. One Defendant, Montgomery, entered into a plea bargain with
the State and was convicted. Before sentencing he was called to testify as a witness
at the trial of the other Defendant, Smith.
Montgomery invoked the privilege against
self-incrimination and the trial court sustained his requeSt. The court of special
appeals affirmed the trial court, relying on
language in McClain v. State, 10 Md. App.
106, 268 A.2d 572, eert. denied, 259 Md.
733 (1970), where it was held that a witness
may invoke the privilege against selfincrimination where "the criminal action

against him is still pending, as where an
appeal is outstanding." Id. at 114,268 A.2d
at 576. The court of special appeals 10
Smith agreed with the lower court and
held that while "the general rule [is] that
the privilege against self-incrimination
with respect to particular charges is not
available to a witness whose prosecution
on those charges has terminated by a guilty
verdict and sentence," Smith, 283 Md. at
190,388 A.2d at 540 (citing United States v.
Gernie, 252 F .2d 664, 670 (2d Cir.), eert.
denied, 356 U.S. 968 (1958», "a witness
whose time for appeal had not expired was
deemed to fall within an exception to the
general rule" and was therefore entitled to
invoke the privilege. Ellison, 310 Md. at
251, 528 A.2d at 1274 (1987); see Mills v.
United States, 281 F.2d 736, 741 (4th Cir.
1960) (distinguishing Gernie).
In response to the court of special
appeals' continuum theory, the court of
appeals again referred to Smith where it
was held that it was "not necessary that
the testimony will with certainty lead to
further criminal conviction. Rather, there
must only be a 'reasonable cause to apprehend danger.'" Smith, 283 Md. at 193,388
A.2d at 542 (quoting Hoffman 'V. United
States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951». Additionally, the court of appeals stated that "a
criminal defendant's chance of overturning a verdict or sentence on appeal certainly does not fall into the category of a mere
remote possibility." Ellison, 310 Md. at
257, 528 A.2d at 1277 (1987). The court
noted that of thirty-two recent criminal
appeals in Maryland only fifteen were
affirmed in their entirety, while six had
verdicts affirmed but sentences vacated;
three had verdicts affirmed in part and
reversed in part; and eight resulted in judgments being reversed or vacated. Id. at 258,
528 A.2d at 1277-78. Also, defendants seeking a sentence review run the risk that
their sentence could be increased as a result
of information which may come to light if
they are compelled to testify.
Thus, it was apparent to the court of
appeals that until the thirty-day time limit
for filing an appeal or requesting a review
of sentence had expired, Little was entitled
to invoke the privilege against selfincrimination in the state's proceedings
against Ellison.
Ellison's second ground for appeal was
that the lower court erred in accepting the
state's position that Little was entitled to
invoke the privilege against selfincrimination because his testiniony might
lead the state to charge him with additional crimes, such as conspiracy to commit
murder. Conversely, it was Ellison's contention that Little's position was unfounded because the state would be precluded

from bringing additional charges by the
prior plea bargain or by principles of double Jeopardy. The court of special appeals
accepted the state's position, however the
court of appeals declined review of that
argument in light of its determinative
holding on Ellison's first ground for
appeal.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has
thus held in this case that, until the thirtyday time period for taking an appeal or
requesting a sentence review has expired,
the very real possibility of reversal on
appeal or imposition of an augmented jail
term is sufficient to justify a non-party
witness' use of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

-Steven E. Sunday
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